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‘ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION’: A STUDY OF LOW-COST 
MANUFACTURING ENCLAVES IN BATAM ISLAND, INDONESIA 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Singapore’s transborder industrialization projects in China and India have received much 
attention. This regionalization initiative was intended to set in place a strategic configuration 
for the city-state to restructure its domestic industries and, pari passu, retain important 
linkages with contiguous, low-cost environments. Our study reports on Singapore’s 
pioneering, albeit lesser-known, project - Batamindo Industrial Park – in neighboring Batam 
Island, Indonesia, and finds that the strategic intent of this policy gambit remains stymied 
by non-economic, socio-political complexities in the host environment, and the 
economics of competition from other industrial estates in the vicinity of this prototype, 
remains to be addressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Not long after its independence, the island nation of Singapore recognized that it 
must be plugged into the global economy. A lack of natural resources made it an 
imperative for the city-state to develop the ability to leverage on global resources for 
economic growth (Murray and Pereira, 1995). However, by the mid-1980s, a 
combination of rising domestic labor costs and increasing competition from regional 
economies created a necessity for Singapore to shift away from a labor-intensive 
paradigm to one more focused on quality and service.  The Singapore government thus 
takes the initiative to develop regional sites as locations to access resources and markets 
(Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993; Singapore Economic Development Board, 1995a, 
1995b). This strategic maneuver was premised on the perception that the redistribution of 
manufacturing activities to low-cost industrial sites will enhance the collective 
competitiveness of Singapore-based companies that redistribute their resource-dependent 
operations to these enclaves, as well as Singapore’s own competitiveness as a high-value 
investment location with strategic linkages to the region (Regnier, 1993; Okposin, 1999).  
“Going regional is, therefore, about investing our expertise and 
capabilities in other growth areas in the region, interlocking them with 
our domestic economy. It is to strengthen our domestic economy, expand 
our national economic zone, and ratchet up our standard of living. This is 
the mission of our regionalization drive.”  
 - Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong (Regionalization Forum, 1993) 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) was the prototype of this strategic initiative and 
has, indeed, been a centre of investment and growth for the region – so much so, in fact, 
that it has served to catalyze the growth of competitor parks in the region, parks that are, 
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ironically, threatening BIP’s own exclusive competitive advantages – advantages which 
may be rather less ‘exclusive’ and ‘advantageous’ than initially thought, as we will 
discuss in the following sections. Against this backdrop, and set within the context of 
recent announcements that Singapore and Indonesia will work together to develop new 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Indonesia (Straits Times, March 19,2006), a revisit on 
the ‘measured success’  of Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) – is imperative.  
 To provide context to this discussion, the theoretical considerations underpinning 
Singapore’s transborder industrialization initiative are sketched in the next section. The 
following section takes a closer look at BIP’s progress and, to briefly introduce several of 
the major competitor parks in the region. We will then present our data and findings in 
the following section, examining the challenges confronting the project, using 
comparative data drawn from empirical surveys of tenants of both BIP and the competitor 
parks to reinforce the analyses, with particular reference to the parks’ progress in 
attracting investment, as well as, in BIP’s case, to Singapore’s transborder 
industrialization initiative. The final section considers the implications of this new 
evidence to Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative, coming to the conclusion that a 
conflation of environmental factors, both internal and external, has quite arguably shown 
the structural limitations of this prototype project, and, by extension, the fundamental 
limitations of the initiative itself. 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Dunning’s (1988) eclectic paradigm can be utilized to provide the analytical basis 
for explaining Singapore’s heavy investments beyond her national boundaries. The OLI 
paradigm was used to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, and to 
look into the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign 
production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource flows, through 
the interaction of Ownership-specific (O) advantages, Location-specific (L) advantages, 
and Internalization-incentive (I) advantages The framework goes on to assert the 
importance of each advantage in the OLI triumvirate and how the relationship between 
them varies across firms, industries and countries. The acquisition of the O advantages 
through exploitation of firm-specific resources, and the simultaneous procurement of I 
advantages through the diminution of transaction costs is a common sight among firms. 
As firms’ core competencies become increasingly knowledge-intensive, MNCs will tend 
to seek locations in which they can best utilize their core competencies; or when there is a 
balance between the three criteria of the OLI- model. In short, foreign investment will 
occur only if it is advantageous to combine spatially transferable intermediate products 
produced in the home country, with at least some immobile factor endowments or other 
intermediate products in another country.  
More recent literature has widened the ambit of the eclectic paradigm to include 
deliberations on the roles of government in advancing the competitiveness of a country 
(Dunning and Narula, 1996), or regions within a country, as created assets supersede 
natural factor endowments as determinants of investment location (Dunning, 1995). 
Stopford (1999) and others (surveyed in Dunning, 1999) similarly argues that 
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governments need to ensure that the availability, quality and cost-effectiveness of general 
purpose inputs have to match up to the standards of global competitors, as well as to 
create and sustain an institutional framework and ethics.  
BIP represents a collaborative effort by the governments of Singapore and 
Indonesia in creating additional advantages through the propitious combination of cost-
effective factors of production, efficient infrastructure, and management expertise; i.e. 
supplementing natural location-specific advantages with engineered ones crafted to 
attract foreign direct investments to the industrial township. Abundance of cheap skilled 
and unskilled labor, combined with superior infrastructure within the park and strong 
governmental support allows for value-added activities to be conducted at low cost (Perry, 
1991; Thant et al, 1994; van Grunsven et al, 1995).  
 
BATAMINDO INDUSTRIAL PARK (BIP), INDONESIA 
The late 1960s witnessed Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands, with 
strategically-located Batam Island being identified as a potential logistics and operational 
base to support offshore oil and gas fields. A significant step in the island’s development 
was the assignment of Batam’s development responsibility to the Batam Industrial 
Development Authority (BIDA) in 1978. BIDA’s then chairman, B.J. Habibie, favored 
attempts to engineer accelerated technological breakthroughs based on state-directed 
investment. This was reflected in the 1979 master plan, which focused on the 
establishment of industrial estates, the development of marshalling areas for imports and 
exports, the construction of tourist facilities and the provision of infrastructural support. 
This master plan recognized that the Riau islands with its location-specific advantages, 
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such as abundant land and cheap labor, were well-positioned to address Singapore’s land 
and labor constraints and, more importantly, to take advantage of Singapore's established 
business and financial services network and the city-state's efficient facilities for 
communication, transportation and other services (Yeoh et al, 1992; Ho and So, 1997). 
BIP was developed as part of the Economic Co-operation Agreement within the Riau 
Development Framework, which was signed by Singapore and Indonesia in August 1990. 
BIP was launched in 1992, and started as a joint-venture between Singapore’s 
government-linked companies (GLCs) and the Salim Group of Indonesia. The 
Singaporean partners were given control over the development and management of the 
park, while Salim’s role was to facilitate operations and to provide a guarantee of priority 
over regulatory controls and administrative approvals. Singapore’s reputation for 
transparent and efficient management of projects lent further credibility to the projects 
and maximized marketing leverage over Singapore-based multinationals (Grundy-Warr, 
1999). BIP was envisaged as a self-contained environment with its communication and 
business linkages through Singapore rather than through Indonesia.  Labour was recruited 
mainly from Java and Sumatra. BIP’s first tenants arrived in 1991, mainly subsidiaries of 
American, European and Japanese multinationals already operating in Singapore. Since 
then, the number of tenants has increased 5-fold, from 17 in 1991, to 88 at present, and at 
its peak, BIP registered 94 tenants. More than half are Japanese companies, with 
Singaporean-owned companies forming the next largest concentration. American and 
European investors have a limited presence. Cumulative investment, as at 2005, is in 
excess of US$1 billion whilst annual export values from the tenant-firms topped US$2 
billion. The Park’s industrial niche is in assembly operations, employing young female 
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labor. Over 85% of the 65,000-strong workforce are female, most aged from 18-22. 
There is a distinct concentration on electronics operations – mainly various component 
assembly processes – and on supporting activities to the electronics sector. Despite 
concerns over the slowdown in new investment commitments, existing tenants are 
reportedly expanding their operations, whilst plans are in the pipeline to further expand 
the park. BIP was also the first industrial park in the Asia-Pacific region to be certified 
ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 14001. 
An industrial township, thus, has been developed; but the story is far from over – 
indeed, this is, in a way, only part of a much larger story, with the development of the 
entire region introducing, inevitably, the inception of competitors to the erstwhile ‘first-
mover’, BIP. Several commentators have alluded to the erosion of BIP’s competitiveness, 
with the mushrooming of 13 other industrial parks scattered throughout the island. With 
cheaper alternative sites readily available both within and beyond Batam, the premium 
placed on BIP’s formulaic one-stop service and self-sufficient operating environment is 
increasingly called into question. We update on these developments in the next section. 
 
COMPETITOR PARKS 
 In physical design, the larger industrial townships that are already in operation (or 
under development) in Batam tend to be patterned along similar lines to BIP. The 
administrative context, on the other hand, is different. In the BIP model, the Singapore 
investors are government-linked companies whereas in the other parks, the Singaporean 
investors are drawn from the private sector. Another difference is the administrative and 
regulatory environment in BIP compared with those in the competitor parks. For BIP, the 
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endorsement from senior politicians has provided a degree of administrative certainty 
further strengthened by the political protection of the local partners in the project. In the 
competitor parks, the projects must contend with multiple tiers of government 
administration, and the competition between these tiers during a time of economic and 
political change. The motivation for the projects in the competitor parks is also more 
diffused than in the case of BIP. In the latter case, the primary concern has been to 
exploit the complementarities of the two contiguous economies. The BIP prototype has 
had a political objective to demonstrate the strength of the ‘Singapore industrial 
development model’, and its transferability to other Asian environments. The competitor 
parks have narrower (and much simpler) commercial objectives, based on the perception 
that Batam has a definite cost-advantage advantage in low-cost industrial activities. 
 
PANBIL INDUSTRIAL ESTATE (PIE), INDONESIA 
Panbil is also located in Mukakuning district, in close proximity to BIP. It is 
connected by a network of roads – and thus provides easy access – to Hang Nadim 
International Airport, ports and other various commercial centers. It was started by PT 
Nusatama Properata Panbil, in conjunction with Panbil Investment Holding Company 
and Harapan Jaya Sentosa group, which includes established companies in the spheres of 
planning, development, construction and management of industrial, commercial, and 
residential properties. The development cost of the project is reportedly estimated at 
US$150 million, and encompasses an integrated township concept with its own range of 
facilities and amenities including power supply, a water treatment plant, a commercial 
centre and a residential village, among others. Investors at Panbil similarly enjoy 
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incentives such as 100% foreign ownership and other tax concessions – incentives, it has 
been noted, that are quite comparable to those accorded to BIP’s tenants.  
 
TUNAS INDUSTRIAL ESTATE (TIE), INDONESIA 
Tunas Industrial Estate, managed by PT Tritunas Mandiri, is a smaller industrial 
park compared to the BIP and PIE. TIE is developed by PT Rezeki Putra Riau, which 
also built and managed Top 100 Plaza and supermarket chains, houses, shophouses, 
warehouse, and factory buildings in Batam. TIE is located near Batam’s seaport and ferry 
terminals and, like BIP and PIE, offers telecommunication and information networks, on-
site utilities, estate management and security services, dormitories and commercial-cum-
residential amenities. TIE’s tenant mix includes 3 Japan firms, 4 Singapore firms, 1 
Taiwan firm, 1 Hong Kong firm, and 8 Indonesian firms, while their production mix 
ranges from warehouse consumer goods, electronics product, metal molding to industrial 
services. Like BIP and PIE, Tunas Industrial Estate was conceived as an all-in-one 
service provider. 
TIE’s construction commenced in 1999, and the park started operations in 2001. 
The management team adopted customer-oriented and quality-focused, to differentiate 
itself from the other industrial estates; there is an emphasis on building rapport with the 
tenants to foster stronger working relationships. 
 
CITRA NUANA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
Citra Buana Industrial Estate, managed by PT Citra Buana Prakarsa and PT Citra 
Buana Batam Industries, consists of three industrial parks – Park I, Park II and Park III, 
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which are located in different areas within Batam. Park I and Park II, are both located at 
Kampung Seraya.  Park III is located at Batam Centre. The parks have been in operation 
since 1994, 2000 and 2002 respectively. Unlike the other three parks (BIP, PIE and TIE), 
Citra Buana does not rely on a self-contained industrial township concept to differentiate 
itself from the other industrial parks. For instance, the park relies on the national power 
grid to provide its tenants with electricity. Noticeably, there is a lack of accommodation 
and commercial facilities within the park, when compared with the other industrial 
estates. However, Citra Buana maintains that its ‘strong connections’ with the central 
government provide its investors with a ’competitive edge’. The occupancy rate in Park I, 
Park II and Park III are currently at 95%, 100% and 60% respectively. To attract tenants 
with different needs, Park I is targeted at small-scale industries whose factory space is 
often used for storage purposes; Park II and Park III, as extensions from Park I, 
accommodate the larger-scale manufacturing facilities.  
 
LATRADE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
Latrade Industrial Park (LIP), reportedly being developed at a cost of US$180 
million, is one of the latest industrial estates in Batam. LIP is strategically situated in the 
densely populated Tanjung Uncang area and was designed to cater for light to medium 
industries such as textile, warehousing, packing and printing.  It also seeks to rival BIP’s 
infrastructure by offering various forms of utilities and amenities that facilitate business 
operations. For instance, LIP boasts uninterrupted electricity supply, and reliable water 
supply as well as modern telecommunications facilities.  LIP presently has 68 units of 
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factory space and, like BIP, also offers dormitories, clinics, banks and a sports centre, as 
well as a one-stop support services. 
 
BINTANG INDUSTRIAL PARKS I and II 
Bintang Industrial Parks I and II are developed by PT Bintang Propertindo, a 
subsidiary of the BJS Group. Park I was opened in December 1995, and, in the second 
phase, Park II was launched in 2001.  These pseudo-integrated industrial parks boast 
amenities such as clinics, food centers, and are in the midst of constructing dormitories, 
restaurants and retail outlets for their clientele.  Their tenants of both parks originate 
mainly from Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Japan. 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Methodology 
To extend our earlier research on BIP (Yeoh, et al, 2004a; 2004b), and to reinforce 
our analysis on the perceived competition from the competitor parks, we surveyed more 
than 140 tenants in the six case-study parks from August 2004 and February 2006. Our 
field research sought to highlight the different pull factors that attracted the respondents 
to relocate their operations in the respective parks, and the operational constraints they 
encountered. The questionnaire itself was designed as a comparative study to investigate 
the various factors influencing firms’ investment decisions, along with the problems 
faced by their operations; specifically, to test tenants’ perception of the created variables 
meant to give the parks a competitive advantage, as mentioned earlier in this paper, as 
well as measure prior perceptions against current operational realities. The questionnaire 
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comprised three sections. The first section sought to establish the profile of the 
respondent: type of ownership, nature of operations, size of establishment, and market 
orientation, among others. The second section gathered information on the pull factors 
experienced by the tenants. Lastly, the third set investigated the different constraints 
faced by the tenants. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ view on the facilities 
and services in the parks were culled from the open-ended questions. Similar question 
sets were administered in all the case-study parks.  
In all cases, the surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to obtain a 
representative distribution of all tenants in the surveyed parks across both industry and 
nature of operations. Surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews in the case-
study parks, lasting an average of 45 minutes, with senior management to ensure the 
response of the selected tenants, and the holistic and accurate nature of the obtained 
responses.  
 
Profile of Respondents 
There were 61 respondents in the BIP survey, of which 15 were wholly Singapore-
owned, 17 were Singaporean joint ventures, and 33 were wholly foreign-owned. The 
respondents were mainly involved in the manufacturing of intermediate products; 10 of 
the respondents were involved in the manufacture of consumer products, and another 5 
were providers of industrial services. There were 10 respondents with a sales turnovers of 
less than US$5 million, 17 respondents with turnovers between US$5 million and US$50 
million, and the remaining had turnovers exceeding US$50 million. 
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Of the 90 respondents from other Batam parks, 29 were wholly Singapore-owned, 35 
were wholly Indonesian-owned, 15 were wholly foreign-owned and 14 were joint venture. 
As for the nature of operations, 12 of the respondents were involved in the manufacturing 
of intermediate products, 2 were involved in the manufacture of consumer products while 
the remaining are involved in industrial and other services. 16 respondents had a sales 
turnover less than US$5 million and 3 respondents had sales between US$5 million and 
US$50 million. 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the 
responses relating to factors and constraints, a logit model was applied to compare the 
perceived advantages influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-study parks. 
The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form:  
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Where:   Fi = 1 if the factor i is selected, 0 otherwise  
α0 = constant term 
αj = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
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Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that 
the firm choosing that particular pull factor is more likely to be from that particular park 
than the other parks, considered together. For example, where BIP is the dependent 
variable, if the coefficient of F1 is positive and significant, this would suggest that, after 
taking into account the effects of other pull factors, a firm choosing “political 
commitment from the Singapore government” has a higher probability of being a tenant-
firm located in BIP i.e. political commitment from the Singapore government is a 
significant pull factor for the BIP tenants, as compared to tenant-firms in the competitor 
parks.  A similar logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the respondents.   
FINDINGS 
Pull Factors  
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor 
available in the host environments to market BIP. BIP, in theory, supplements these 
purported advantages with the political commitment from the Singapore government, 
with the plethora of bilateral agreements between Singapore’s GLCs and host 
governments, or politically-linked business conglomerates. Furthermore, there exists a 
host of investment incentives that entice multinationals to locate their lower value-added 
activities in BIP, giving it a host of advantages over competitor parks – again, in theory.  
(Insert table 1 here) 
Given BIP’s marketing as a ‘Singapore-styled’ investment locale, supplying quality 
infrastructural facilities, factories, and amenities, it comes as no surprise that BIP tenants 
surveyed ranked reliable infrastructure as the foremost factor influencing their decision to 
invest in the park. Considerations over infrastructural facilities also ranked amongst the 
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priorities of the tenants in the competitor parks, but a positive and statistically significant 
α5 (=2.232) suggested that this was a more significant factor for BIP tenants than those in 
the competitor parks. It is plausible that BIP tenants, who paid premium rates for the 
Singapore-styled infrastructure, were more inclined to emphasize this factor. On the other 
hand, the tenants in the competitor parks were more prepared to strike a compromise 
between reliable infrastructure and lower overhead costs, and were less likely to place as 
much emphasis on this factor. 
From the popular rankings, BIP respondents located in BIP mainly for privileged 
access to overseas markets, whereas the non-BIP firms are more reliant on proximity to 
their relevant buyers.  Our survey results also show the importance of agglomeration 
economics, with the non-BIP parks relying on their role as supporting industries to the 
multinationals in BIP and Singapore.  In addition, BIP firms  export more to overseas 
markets as well as the Singapore market as shown by the positive α9 = (3.454) and α8 = 
(3.307) respectively.  Given that non-BIP parks rank their biggest pull factor as “the 
presence of major buyers”, further indicates that buyers are less of an issue vis-à-vis BIP 
firms in exporting products. 
From the above, then, it would seem as though at least some of BIP’s purported 
advantages, most notably its excellent infrastructural capability and reliability, would 
seem to have contributed quite effectively to the attraction of investment into the 
industrial park. While other such advantages (the Singapore connection, for one) would 
seem to have been of rather less import to investors, the results would seem to imply that, 
up till now, BIP does, indeed, enjoy certain competitive advantages over its competitors. 
 
 17 
Push Factors 
Our study, however, is also concerned with the present; and at the present time, 
our findings allude to some emerging constraints which have undermined the 
attractiveness of the parks. These constraints are categorized into four broad groups, 
namely, labor, organization and technology, competitive environment and the political 
environment, such as government policies and regulations. 
      (Insert table 2 here) 
On labor-related constraints, high absenteeism was ranked last, whilst rising 
labor costs was clearly their priority concern in both BIP and non-BIP firms. This points 
to an overall better attitude of workers in Indonesia, which is not surprising given the 
high unemployment in the archipelago that results in greater competition for jobs. Firms 
interviewed mentioned more stringent selection criteria for workers. Industrial relations 
problems was frequently cited by BIP respondents as compared to non-BIP tenants, and 
further substantiated by the positive and statistically significant ß5 (=0.759); they were 
described as being very disruptive to the operations of the tenants in BIP, as workers 
unhappy with labor laws often employ pressure tactics such as strikes, demonstrations 
and work-to-rule. On the other hand, shortages of suitable unskilled/semi labor were 
found to have affected non-BIP tenants to a greater extent than those in BIP, as indicated 
by the negative and statistically significant ß
 1 (=-0.817). This finding is not surprising, as 
the tenants in the competitor parks are largely small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), engaged in relatively low-cost supporting industries, and hence their dependence 
on unskilled/semi-skilled workers to sustain the viability of their operations.    
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As for organizational and technological-related constraints, the Singapore-
styled infrastructure in BIP, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, 
because facilities such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are 
independently managed. This high and rising cost of infrastructure was also felt by 
respondents in the competitor parks, but more so by BIP respondents. This was suggested 
by the positive and statistically significant ß5 (=1.703). Another organizational/ 
technological constraints faced by BIP respondents, but to a lesser extent by non-BIP 
respondents, was difficulty in obtaining raw materials, indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant ß2 (=1.430). This may be due to perceptions of and frustrations 
over the government’s inefficiency in expediting permits necessary for the procurement 
of raw materials from overseas. The respondents in the competitor parks, given their 
limited scale of operations, are possibly more nimble in sourcing for alternatives; as their 
operations grow in scale, they, too, are likely to suffer more from this constraint. 
 
On competitive constraints, firms in BIP ranked competition from overseas 
competitors as main challenge. A positive and statistically significant ß1 (=2.203) 
however suggests this was less acute for the non-BIP respondents. This is because a high 
percentage of the companies sell overseas and thus they are also facing acute competition 
from overseas.  On the other hand, competition from other industrial parks in Indonesia is 
less of a concern for BIP respondents, as shown by the negative and statistically 
significant ß2 (=-0.950), probably because many of the firms in other industrial parks in 
Indonesia are their suppliers, and thus they are not competing with each other. 
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For political constraints, a lack of transparency and frequent changes in host 
government regulations were the most serious host-environment related constraint faced 
by both respondents in BIP and non-BIP. This problem was particularly acute for BIP 
respondents with frequent changes in the tax regime among the frequently cited examples 
during the on-site interviews. This is reinforced by a positive and significant ß3 = (0.810). 
With firms in BIP having higher operations costs and exports, it would be natural for 
them to face heavy swings in their profit levels given a change in tax rates, vis-à-vis the 
smaller firms in other parks. The park has seen six presidents come and go, each elected 
with different political mandates and agendas; varying tax policies have been, to say the 
least, not insignificant among the many problems this has created for business. 
 
Case Studies 
This section presents the findings of our case studies of four companies drawn 
from BIP’s competitor parks, designed to examine the viability of BIP in attracting and 
retaining its investors in face of the intensifying competition.  
 
Company A 
Company A is a wholly-Indonesian owned company located in TIE, and it 
specializes in carton box manufacturing. It is one of the largest suppliers of carton boxes 
in Indonesia and its Batam subsidiary employs a workforce of around 250 workers. 
The decision to locate in Batam was due to competitive overheads, the reliable 
infrastructure facilities and competitive labor costs. However, Company A also 
highlighted that rising ‘labor’ tax imposed by the government has taken a toll on the 
company. Other labor-related constraints faced by the company included low motivation 
 20 
of workers. In response, Company A has embarked on certain policies such as incentive 
schemes to encourage higher productivity, and adoption of local practices to conform to 
local cultures. Significantly, the main reason that Company A chose to set up in TIE, 
instead of BIP, was due to the high rental cost in BIP.  
 
Company B 
Company B is a wholly Indonesian-owned company, dealing with the extrusion of 
aluminum. The management explained that TIE was selected for its strategic location and 
the availability of land space. Company B’s management commented on the 
professionalism of the Park’s management, and effective communication between the 
tenants and the Park’s management. Importantly, the competitive overheads, particularly 
rental costs, were cited as differentiating factors that sealed the decision to be located in 
Tunas. As a case in point, Company B categorically stated that the rental rates for BIP 
proved to be such a great deterrent that the company ‘was not interested in BIP at all’, 
while PIE’s factories were also not suitable for the company’s operations. In contrast, 
TIE provided factories with designs customized to the company’s operations. Company B 
indicated its satisfaction with TIE’s facilities and services, and stated its preferences to 
expand within the estate. 
 
Company C 
Company C established itself first in BIP in 1991, before relocating to Citra 
Buana Park II. The company completed its shift to Citra Buana Park II in 2000, 
occupying 70% of the park’s land. Wholly Japanese-owned, Company C also has 
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operations in Malaysia, Vietnam and China which, interestingly, are much smaller scale 
operations than their Batam operations.  
Amongst the reasons cited for its establishment in Batam, and specifically BIP in 
the early years, were competitive labor costs, tax-free environment, positive market 
conditions and the strong links between the Park and the government authorities. 
However, the decision to relocate to Citra Buana Park II was propelled by the cheaper 
rental costs offered by the latter. 
 When requested to do a comparison between BIP and Citra Buana, the company 
affirmed that operational costs were the most significant difference, at a remarkable 60% 
reduction after the shift. Unlike BIP, Citra Buana did not provide reliable electricity. 
However, Company C was able to circumvent this problem by generating its own 
electricity. In addition, the company had also forged partnership with the other companies 
within Citra Buana Park, whereby the companies would supply each other with 
manufacturing components. Better management at Citra Buana was also cited as one of 
the pull factors. However, the decision to relocate eventually came down to the difference 
in operating costs.  
 
Company D 
A Singaporean-owned company involved in the manufacture of medical 
equipment, Company D located to Batam in 1997 to capitalize on the location advantages 
apparent in the area. Currently located at Citra Buana Park II, the company exports 100% 
of its products and employs a workforce of 600.  
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The company decided to locate in Batam due to the proximity to Singapore which 
not only facilitated the monitoring the Batam operations, but also access to lower 
operating costs. However, Company D lamented on the constraints faced, which included 
‘unnecessary problems’ with the local authorities, but declined to elaborate further. As 
well, a lack of work ethics, and a high frequency of strikes also aggravated the already 
low labor productivity.  
Significantly, when asked on his decision to locate in Citra Buana and not BIP 
(given that BIP was reputed to provide ‘protection from regulatory challenges, and that 
the intervening presence of the Singapore government has been said to reduce corruption 
within the host environment), Company D’s managing director explained that the 
perceived “protection” was not apparent. In reality, there was no difference in the 
locations except the overhead costs. He supported his view by providing examples of 
companies which chose to relocate, after realizing the facilities and services offered by 
BIP can be replicated elsewhere at more competitive rates. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 From our empirical studies, the consensus is that the political climate created by 
the Singapore and Indonesian governments, the factor conditions and the created 
infrastructures are the main determinants that shape the synergistic appeal of BIP.  BIP, 
being the pioneer industrial park in Batam, can also be credited with turning Batam into 
an attractive low-cost investment location. The subsequent mushrooming of 13 other 
industrial parks, though not the original strategic intent for commissioning the BIP 
project, allowed Batam to cater to a wider range of investors, each with varied budgets 
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and operational requirements. Faced with keen competition, each of these parks is forced 
to constantly improve and innovate as they seek to survive in the competitive 
environment, in the process, further augmenting the overall appeal of Batam. The 
resultant influx and clustering of firms within Batam, albeit in different industrial parks, 
creates a reinforcing process whereby more firms are encouraged to invest in Batam to 
capitalize on the economies of agglomeration. This represents a step forward towards 
achieving the (Singapore) government’s long-term vision of twinning the contiguous 
Singapore-Riau economies. On the other hand, firms invested in PIE and TIE for reasons 
largely similar to that of BIP investors (although to differing extents), with the exception 
of political commitment from Singapore. In addition, the presence of major buyers 
proved to be a more important consideration for PIE/TIE tenants than BIP tenants. 
Tenants in all three survey industrial parks were also able to tap into the low-cost 
environments of the parks (although said costs proved to be somewhat less ‘low-cost’ 
than they might have thought), as well as leverage on Singapore-styled infrastructure 
(which PIE and TIE had both sought to emulate), management and expertise. These 
findings lend support to the rationalization theories presented in this paper, and affirm the 
agglomeration economies suggested by the location theories.   
  Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically `engineered’, inter-
government endorsement of the flagship projects, and the enormous resources mobilized 
through the strategic partnerships, has failed to shield BIP from a gamut of problems. 
Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of BIP are well-discussed in  
earlier papers (Yeoh et al, 2000, 2004a); more recently, press reports have also drawn 
attention to the influx of immigrants to the islands and, concomitantly, to the social 
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problems of squatter settlements which threaten to overwhelm the investment value of the 
Indonesian parks. The decline of the Salim Group political influence has left BIP’s ability 
to gain privileged access to the central government in doubt (Dieleman and Sach, 2005), 
while the decentralization of power to the provincial government in recent years has 
exacerbated the increasingly complex regulatory environment for business development. 
The following observations update on recent developments and offer new insights on BIP 
in Indonesia. 
The growing influence and sophistication of its competitor parks is also a concern 
for BIP. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent Indonesian 
politicians, have sprouted around BIP.  PIE, as mentioned earlier, is located directly 
opposite BIP, and offers similar factories at competitive rentals. In fact, PIE has taken 
BIP’s one-stop and self-sufficient environment concept one step further by integrating a 
shopping complex and executive housing into their industrial park, both with some 
success. TIE, which clinched seven new tenants within five months in 2006, attributed 
their success to relationship building; Latrade Industrial Park, Citra Buana Industrial Park 
I and II and Bintang Industrial Park, have all made significant inroads into the small-and-
medium enterprise segment. Competition among these competitor parks had been nothing 
less than cut-throat, with many park operators willing to provide substantive discounts to 
attract new tenants.  
BIP’s growth momentum has stagnated in recent years, with several new 
investments trending towards competitor parks, persuaded by the lure of lower cost and 
better value for their investments. The premium placed on BIP’s formulaic one-stop 
service, and self-sufficient operating environment, is increasingly called into question.  
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As well, competition is not limited to within Batam or other parts of Indonesia. 
China and India’s growing economic importance is increasingly redirecting foreign direct 
investments otherwise headed for this region into these two countries, as firms seek to 
benefit through closer proximity to their enormous domestic markets. On a broader front, 
foreign investors have also taken issue over the perceived reluctance of authorities to 
clamp down on worksite stoppages1. Recent press reports on Batam’s investor exodus2 
cited sluggish bureaucracy, lack of legal certainty and security, and unclear investment 
policies as reasons for investors relocating their investments from the province, and 
Indonesia. Populist measures such as raising the minimum wage before general elections 
further heighten the reluctance of investors to pour money into the country. Anecdotal 
evidence, gathered from our on-site interviews with the management and tenants of the 
case-study parks revealed that new investments into Batam are drying up as a result of 
intense competition from competitor parks in the region (notably China and Vietnam), 
and compounded by the host of internal problems, perceived or otherwise, that radiate 
from the host environment. Investor interest appears to have shifted to other industrial 
parks in China, Vietnam and other emerging economies, including a new manufacturing 
powerhouse, India3. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                 
1
 The Straits Times, August 24, 2002. 
2
 The Straits Times, August 30, 2003; The Straits Times, December 5, 2003. 
3
 Financial Times, November 30, 2005 
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To a large extent, BIP has succeeded in providing the crucial links within the 
value-added chain that give client firms a competitive advantage. While BIP is now a 
well-established project, it has not necessarily achieved all its development goals in the 
framework of Singapore’s transborder industrialization strategy. It has been a 
springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear that 
Singapore has obtained the resource benefits looked for. The problem lies on the flip side 
of the desired strategic fit – the host country’s ability to provide comparative advantages. 
In both scenarios, the host government has succeeded only in making available the 
advantages of ‘basic factors of production’. Thus, while the case-study parks do provide 
some components of comparative advantage which the host country does not (e.g. 
reliable infrastructure), the strategic intent of these flagship projects remains stymied by 
non-economic, socio-political complexities in the larger host environment. Despite 
retaining certain first mover advantage, BIP must contend with rising competition from 
the newer industrial developments, as well as the restricted appeal of its operating 
conditions.  
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TABLE 1 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decision to Locate in the Case-Study Parks 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimates - 
Binary Logits 
BIP Non-BIP Variables 
α ι p-value 
Frequen
cy 
Ran
k 
Frequenc
y 
Ran
k 
Political commitment from 
Singapore Government 1.459 0.345  18 6 6 8 
Stable Government 1.660 0.042 ** 15 7 33 3 
Relatively Low restriction on 
foreign owner ship 3.239 0.019 ** 7 8 6 8 
Availability of Land -2.556 0.073 * 4 9 23 5 
Reliable Infrastructure facilities 
in the industrial Estate 2.232 0.028 ** 39 1 28 4 
Availability of skilled/ educated 
labour 
-
1.007 0.290  20 3 18 6 
Presence of Major Buyers -1.248 0.199  20 3 42 1 
Access to Singapore Market 3.307 0.022 ** 19 5 40 2 
Access to Overseas Market 3.454 0.017 ** 25 2 12 7 
Constant -6.393 
0.000
1 
**
* 
    
 
Source: Questionnaire survey  
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests. Forced-entry regression method is used. 
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
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TABLE 2 
Major Constraints On The Respondents’ Operations In The Case Study Parks 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimates - 
Binary Logits 
BIP Non-BIP 
Variables 
α ι p-value 
Frequ-
ency 
Ran
k 
Frequenc
y Rank 
Labor Constraint        
Shortage of semi/unskilled 
labour 
-0.817 0.049 ** 11 4 37 2 
Shortage of  professionals and 
managers 
-0.146 0.720  16 3 31 3 
Rising labor costs 0.511 0.188  33 1 47 1 
High absenteeism -0.234 0.753  3 5 8 5 
Industrial relations problems 0.759 0.049 ** 23 2 25 4 
        Organizational/Technological 
Constraints        
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment -0.237 0.624  9 5 23 5 
Difficulty in obtaining raw 
material  1.430 0.001 *** 23 2 22 4 
Difficulty introducing new 
technology and/or techniques -0.108 0.808  12 4 29 3 
Lack of good supporting service 0.062 0.880  21 3 34 2 
High overheads 1.703 0.0001 *** 37 1 44 1 
        Competitive Constraints        
Competition from overseas 
competitors 2.023 0.001 *** 41 1 40 1 
Competition from other 
industrial park in Indonesia -0.950 0.073 * 7 2 37 2 
Reduced Involvement from 
Singapore Government -0.847 0.455  1 4 8 3 
Protectionist Barrier: restricting 
market access to developed 0.503 0.551  3 3 7 4 
        Host-Environment Constraints        
Lack of special connection with 
local business groups -0.570 0.222  9 3 21 3 
Problems with local / provincial 
authorities 0.754 0.049 ** 27 2 37 2 
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Lack of transparency/frequent 
changes in host government 
regulation 
0.810 0.073 * 40 1 60 1 
Lack of support from Singapore 
government -1.654 0.015 ** 3 4 18 4 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey  
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests. Forced-entry regression method is used. 
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at the 10% level 
